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Book Reviews 
THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION. By William 
F. Harris IJ.l Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
1993. Pp. xv, 208. Cloth, $38.50. 
Rebecca L. Brownz 
What exactly is the Constitution? William Harris tantalizes 
with a promise to take up that question that has long daunted 
constitutional theorists. He rightly suggests that the question 
logically precedes any theory about how interpreters should read 
the document. A sense of excitement accompanies Harris' claim 
to have identified the nature of the Constitution in such a way as 
to provide a philosophical framework for objectively evaluating 
various approaches to constitutional interpretation. Some inter-
pretative theories will be shown to be right, some wrong. At last, 
it appears, someone has set out to resolve H.L.A. Hart's impor-
tant conundrum that there is "no rule providing criteria for the 
assessment of its own legal validity,"3 which has had such poign-
ant application to the field of constitutional interpretation. But 
the results are disheartening. 
Harris starts from the position that the constitutional debate 
over the last several decades has been misguided and lacking in 
moorings. The resulting discourse has thus become perversely 
rigid and riddled with unexamined assumptions, consequences 
that Harris-a political science scholar-attributes across the 
board to the study of law in general. Those who study and apply 
the law have done it wrong. Apparently legal academics, judges, 
and lawyers (and perhaps even Senators) all fall into the category 
of misdemeanants whom Harris, with palpable bitterness, collec-
tively brands "professionalized law." The book has a real sense 
of "us"/"them" hostility, peppered with territorial war metaphors 
to suggest that constitutional theory has unjustifiably been an-
nexed as a domain of the law. This usurpation has led to "the 
capture of the field by professionalized law," relegating the read-
1. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania. 
2. Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. 
3. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 104 (Clarendon Press, 1961). 
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ing of the Constitution to "parsing techniques legal professionals 
use to open black-letter snippets to their advantage." Thus, Har-
ris believes, "[t]he first step toward a paradigm may be to break 
the tandem between, or ... to disrupt the nesting of, constitu-
tional theory and legal science." 
In support of his assertion that constitutional theorists lack a 
guiding paradigm, Harris quotes a critique written by Sanford 
Levinson. And in the development of his own such paradigm, he 
borrows expressly from the "conceptual qualities" propounded 
by H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin and John Hart Ely. It strikes 
me as odd that he does not acknowledge that these thinkers are 
themselves denizens of the universe that he condemns in toto. 
The reliance on Levinson's critique is especially ironic in its testa-
ment to the heterogeneity of this world of "professionalized 
law," which certainly boasts thoughtful members who eschew the 
rigid at least as ardently as Harris himself does. Others who 
might be mentioned are not. As for Harris, his contempt for the 
"perverse rigidities" that mark the study of constitutional law has 
led him to construct a two-axis model for the resolution of inter-
pretative problems! And that model is called The Interpretable 
Constitution. 
My criticism of this work follows two paths. First, I will pro-
vide a short and accessible version of what I understand the the-
ory to be and explain why I do not think the case has been made 
for its validity. But my more important objection to this book 
lies in the very concerns that apparently led Harris to write it: 
even if internally sound, the theory amounts to but one more 
illusory means for judges to avoid judging, to provide the fa~ade 
of objectivity to the project of reading the Constitution-or, in 
this case, to the project of testing the legitimacy of ways of read-
ing the Constitution.4 This particular variation happens to offer a 
bit more leeway to the interpreter than does strict formalism, tex-
tualism, or intentionalism, but Harris' enterprise is by its very 
nature not different in kind. He wishes to seek out "right" ways 
to answer constitutional questions, ways that do not change ac-
cording to who the interpreter is, ways that, by claim to "legiti-
macy," can rightfully displace "illegitimate" ones. It is this effort 
that I believe is misguided. 
4. I should note that Harris does not view his project as being about judicial review 
at all; indeed, he believes that focus has been one of the factors to lead prior attempts at 
constitutional theory astray. In a footnote, he suggests that his matrix for resolving con-
stitutional issues would apply equally well to any of the branches of government, or even 
to private constitutional "interpreters" if they were given the option to displace the courts 
in this regard. 
1994-95) BOOK REVIEW 589 
I 
The book endeavors to define what the Constitution is by 
resort to an elaborate metaphor between language and politics. 
This intriguing correspondence enjoys a long history stemming to 
classic liberal political theory and with roots more ancient. Bet-
ter yet, it rings true. Intuitively we accept the notion that speech, 
either as historical or cultural narrative or as command, provides 
a foundation for the identity of a people, just as the social con-
tract provides a foundation for its security and perpetuation. 
Harris reminds us that God created, with names, the separations 
that gave life to the universe and thus established political au-
thority. He suggests that "communication (storytelling) is condu-
cive to community (political life)." He quotes John Locke's 
observation that language "was to be the great instrument and 
common tie of society." And he resorts to the familiar platonic 
image of patterning the "polis" after the "logos" to establish the 
"primal interpenetration" of language and politics. The parallels 
between language and politics are striking and largely 
unexceptionable. 
But for Harris this intuitive notion of parallels is only the 
beginning. He wishes to use the metaphor as a cornerstone for 
the project of identifying the true nature of the Constitution. In 
pursuit of that objective, Harris focuses on the work of Thomas 
Hobbes, from whom he derives the principle that words can be 
understood to bind action through the concept of a social con-
tract. If one designates the social contract (a creature of lan-
guage) as a source of political authority, one thus establishes a 
political order that can be grasped, through language, with the 
intellect. Civil power, then, is derived from the model of lan-
guage, projected onto the political realm. 
The real question is whether this still quite simple founda-
tion can support the monumental edifice that Harris seeks to 
erect upon it. Expressly abstracting well beyond the work of 
Hobbes, Harris draws what he terms a "homology" (indicating a 
greater degree of identity than a mere analogy) between lan-
guage and politics. He claims that "reasoning and governing are 
parallel first and second orders of the same calculus." This gives 
rise to a syllogism of sorts, in which the "natural person" or citi-
zen is said to bear the same relationship to reason and language 
that the "artificial person" or polity bears to government and so-
cial covenants, respectively. That is, the mode of thinking and 
communicating for an individual is seen as the model for a pol-
ity's actions of regulating, and those who act for the polity repre-
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sent those who reason as individuals. The act of empowering the 
polity constitutes authority, or, literally, authorship of the speech 
of the artificial person by the natural person. With a chart, Har-
ris illustrates the parallels between the "first order," citizen and 
natural reason, on the one hand, and the "second order," com-
monwealth and governing, on the other.s 
Harris turns next to the American Constitution. The history 
of its making and its express origins in the people correspond 
nicely to the theoretical construct of collective power and author-
ity described above. The written Constitution both implicates 
(by being a social contract) and illustrates (by being written) the 
bond of language and power. Having established this profoundly 
metaphorical relationship, Harris applies to the political text 
what he views as the two essential features of language, namely 
authorship and intelligibility. Thus carried over to the analogue 
political text, the parallel attributes become authority and legibil-
ity. That is, if the metaphor is to hold, the constitutive document 
must be both authorized by the people (which ours was) and legi-
ble to it, which is made possible by the written nature of our 
Constitution and the process of public interpretation. "To erect a 
constitutional order with public writing is to ground it not only in 
political collectivity but also in individual intelligence" -a struc-
ture both authoritative and comprehensible. 
Focusing on the concept that the constitutional order must 
be "legible" to the polity, Harris turns to the task of interpreta-
tion. "[B]ecause the Constitution styles itself as the 'word of the 
People,' constitutional interpretation should be addressed to the 
people at large . . . . They are speakers as well as listeners, and 
their status as the interpretive audience of the Constitution is re-
ciprocal to the Constitution's bindingness on themselves and the 
polity that they are the constituents of." Harris claims that cer-
tain conclusions about interpretative methodology follow from 
this statement. Most important, it gives rise to the conclusion 
that the "true" Constitution does not only consist of the written 
text within its four comers, but also incorporates the political sys-
tem that is created thereby. Thus the orders of language and 
politics that provided the initial metaphor are linked together to 
form a whole comprised both of a signifier (the linguistic order) 
and the thing signified (the political order)-the two constitu-
tions. Only in such a relation between constitutional signifier 
5. The chart reflects certain implications, such as that failure of language leads to 
absurdity while failure of political rationality leads to injustice. These interesting observa-
tions are not pursued. 
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and signified is there promise of true legibility. Thus, for Harris, 
it is both of these elements-the text and the polity-that make 
up the Constitution, and to which constitutional interpreters 
must be faithful. He denominates the former the Constitution 
with a "big C" and the latter the constitution with a "small c". 
"American constitutional interpretation is, consequently, in-
dispensably a two-text project." This is the principal claim of the 
book. Harris tells us that "[c]hanged meaning in the elements of 
the polity exercise a conformizing pull on the words of the docu-
ment, and vice versa." The project of interpretation is for Harris 
the mediation of the two, so that the "relations in either text may 
be read with respect to the other." "The document is to be read 
in view of its project, the polity it casts forward into the world of 
performance." Thus, and this almost Elysian notion6 seems criti-
cal to Harris, apparent gaps in the text "are not occasions for the 
hemorrhaging in of material or free-form impositions from 
outside the constitutional order, but instead serve as a mandate 
for reference to the other text." 
Having thus described the constitutional enterprise, Harris 
goes on to lay out a framework for evaluating interpretative 
methods that are "justified" by it. This framework, supplying the 
title and apparently the objective of the book itself, seeks to re-
flect the interconnection between the "upper-case C" Constitu-
tion and the "lower-case c" constitution, between the language of 
the text and the political order created by that language. 
The result is a two-axis model for interpretation. It is a 
model by which theories of constitutional interpretation can be 
evaluated by stacking them up against the designated aspects of 
the two texts and measuring their fidelity to one or the other. 
Moreover, the model ostensibly provides a way by which public 
authoritative interpretations of the text, such as those of the 
Supreme Court, can be justified as legitimate in their method-
again measured by how faithfully they correspond to the con-
straints imposed by both texts. The claim is that only by confin-
ing decisions within this matrix can the interpreter lay claim to 
legitimacy of the project. The four quadrants created by the 
model are said to be the sole considerations that have been em-
bodied in the writing or design of constitutional life, and there-
6. Harris' search for limiting principles is reminiscent of John Hart Ely's rejection 
of external sources of constitutional values, in favor of a search for the few, mostly proce-
dural, values implicit in the constitutional design. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust 73 (Harv. U. Press, 1980). On the aesthetically important question of the appro-
priate adjective to describe Ely's work, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and the Right to be 
Different, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 397, 397 n.2 (1981). 
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fore are the sole approaches that qualify as interpretation of the 
C/constitution. 
The y-axis carries "positivism versus structuralism," and the 
x-axis "immanence versus transcendence." Harris defines the 
terms as follows. Positivism focuses on words and clauses, while 
structuralism, in contrast, emphasizes coherent designs and 
wholes. Immanence means residing within or arising from the 
text of the document; transcendence, in contrast, means coming 
from beyond the document. Thus, the matrix creates four quad-
rants: "immanent positivism (roughly, 'plain words'); immanent 
structuralism ('structure of the document'); transcendent positiv-
ism (roughly, 'spirit of the words'); and transcendent structural-
ism ('logic or structure of the polity'; 'structural fundamental 
values')." Examples of how each of the four categories applies 
suggest that they correspond quite closely, if not perfectly, to the 
variations on textualist and dynamic interpretation totally famil-
iar to those well-versed in the literature today. Indeed, Harris . 
acknowledges that the immanent/transcendent antinomy reflects 
quite closely the "interpretive/noninterpretive" approaches to ju-
dicial review described twenty years ago by Thomas Grey. 
The one new twist in Harris' approach is his claim that his 
four categories comprise the only cognizable sources for constitu-
tional interpretation because only they are derived from the up-
per-and-lower-case "C" constitutions that he has defined as the 
Constitution in the book. Four examples of authorities that Har-
ris claims are excluded from legitimate interpretation by his 
model are the intent of the framers, the consensus of the people, 
the justice of political theory, and the rightness of natural law-
unless those factors can be shown to be in some way subsumed 
by the text or structure of the document itself. 
Harris does not voice a preference for one "quadrant," or 
interpretative approach, over another. Rather, he suggests that a 
judicial decision which could use as many of them as possible 
would be more sound than one which used fewer. One indica-
tion Harris offers for the value of his model is that it would tend 
to refute those theorists who claim to have the exclusive path to 
constitutional truth, his position being that there is no such thing. 
While truth of outcome is beside the point to Harris, he does 
have a clear concern for the true method of getting there. 
II 
The theory is not set out as an argument. It is a series of 
observations, but little effort is made to support or justify each of 
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the steps that build toward the conclusions-either with external 
support or with an internal logical claim to inevitability. The 
most important of the gaps in argumentation comes in the de-
fense of the major assertion of the book, that the Constitution 
"really" consists of two texts and two texts only, the written text 
and the evolving societal unwritten text. While this is a provoca-
tive suggestion, it seems to me that Harris has not made the case 
for it. 
In starkly simple terms, the book offers four propositions. 
In reverse order, starting from the conclusion of the book, the 
first (#1) is that interpretation must be confined to considerations 
implicit in the two texts, written and unwritten. This is true be-
cause, second (#2), the Constitution must be legible to the polity. 
This is true in turn, because, third (#3), the Constitution is a writ-
ten delegation of political authority by the people. And this is 
true because, fourth (#4), language and politics are different or-
ders of the same human endeavor. So stated, the four proposi-
tions manifestly do not proceed logically from one to the other. 
Indeed, the entire first half of the book (devoted to proving #4), 
which demands that the reader arduously follow a byzantine 
chain of reasoning expounded in the most opaque writing, strikes 
me as unnecessary to the stated project of establishing proposi-
tion #1. One has no need to accept the laboriously crafted lan-
guage-politics "homology" (#4) to accept the uncontroversial 
proposition that our Constitution was a delegation of power by 
the people (#3). It seems to me that Chief Justice Marshall said 
as much in Marbury v. Madison7 and McCulloch v. Maryland,s 
that the champions of originalism have frequently proclaimed as 
much,9 and that theorists of all stripes have accepted the notion 
as given.Jo And the idea that the people who granted the power 
must be permitted to understand the consequences of that grant 
(#2) again does not depend on any ethereal argument based on 
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 1n (1803) ("if [an act contrary to the Constitution is law), 
then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power 
in its own nature illimitable."). 
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 403 (1819) ("The government proceeds directly from 
the people."). 
9. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the 
Law 144-46 (Free Press, 1990); Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Ad-
judication, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 723, 724 (1988). 
10. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 6 (Belknap Press, 1991); 
Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1365, 1369-70 (1990); Suzanna 
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1150-51 (1987); 
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf· A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale LJ. 920, 
949 (1973); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution? 27 Stan. L. Rev. 
703, 705 (1975). See also The Federalist No. 22 (Hamilton). 
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philosophical abstractions about language. It simply follows, and 
has followed for years under the rubric of "rule of law," from the 
notion of government by consent.n 
Thus, the book could just as well have begun with the claim 
that the Constitution consists of two texts, the written text and 
the political order. Yet if one considers the proposition that way, 
it becomes clear that it has no support. The critical step in the 
analysis-that legibility necessitates the two-text theory-is not 
logically grounded in the rest of the argument. I am left with the 
large question of why the two-text theory is the only way to make 
the law of the land comprehensible to the people. This book 
does not answer that critical question. 
The two-text idea, from which stems the entire model for 
interpretation, arises solely from the fact of a written constitu-
tion. And, although the book is full of phrases about "Ameri-
can" constitutionalism, the only distinguishing feature about 
American constitutionalism that is identified is the written form 
of the Constitution. The fact that our Constitution is a written 
document undergirds all of the author's metaphors about lan-
guage, legibility, and interaction between document and polity-
in short, everything that supplies the basis for Harris' construct. 
He does not point to anything about the nature of our document, 
except its constitutive purpose, that is relevant to his attempt to 
define the true nature of the framers' project. Thus, it would 
seem, any written constitution would share in common with ours 
the fundamentality that Harris emphasizes as well as the inter-
pretative approaches that he describes. And conversely, it 
would seem, any polity formed on a basis other than a written 
constitution would not share fundamental qualities with ours. 
The former Soviet Union, then, must be said to have had more in 
common with American constitutionalism than does England, a 
proposition that does not seem facially plausible. Yet Harris 
gives all-important status to writtenness, and none to the nature 
of what is written or how it has been understood over time. A 
project that claims to embark on discovering the true nature of 
the American constitutional order should go deeper. 
I think that Harris underestimates the complexities of both 
texts. In particular, he shortchanges the "small-c" constitution, 
the political order in which we live. It seems optimistic in the 
extreme to expect that the values of the contemporary polity will 
11. See Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution 19 (Oxford U. Press, 1992); 
Sanford Levinson, Judicial Review and the Problem of the Comprehensible Constitution, 
59 Tex. L. Rev. 395 (1981). 
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provide determinate limits on the interpretation of constitutional 
language.12 Other scholars have debated at length about what 
types of authority accurately embody the values of our political 
and social community.13 To assert that this sphere, the political 
order created by the Constitution, excludes "the consensus of the 
people," for example, seems an arbitrary limitation on the inter-
pretative task. Similarly, to claim legitimacy for the considera-
tion of "structural fundamental values," while dismissing as 
illegitimate "the justice of political theory," would need further 
support to be a JYersuasive delineation of appropriate bounds of 
interpretation. 
Perhaps the most original and provocative aspect of the the-
ory-the claim that, even given a wide toleration for both for-
malistic and dynamic approaches to interpretation, there are still 
categories of sources that are out of bounds-is not supported by 
the metaphor that gives rise to it. Harris is not careful to explore 
and respect the natural limits of a metaphorical argument. His 
two-text theory arises from the analogy between language and 
governance, and a concomitant need for the governing rules to 
be intelligible to the polity. What is intelligible, according to 
Harris, is the text of the document and the nature of the polity 
itself. Anything else is unintelligible and therefore illegitimate as 
a consideration in interpreting the Constitution. But how does 
the metaphor supply limiting constraints that invalidate other 
considerations? It is one thing to say that as language enjoys in-
telligibility, so might government also enjoy intelligibility of gov-
ernment to the governed. But it is quite another to argue that 
the principle of language-intelligibility-supplies the only legit-
imate objective of constitutional government and that it can be 
provided in only one way. Analogical reasoning does not lay 
claim to the power to define so categorically.14 As a reason for 
this limitation on the interpretative process, Harris states, with a 
formalism reminiscent of that which he criticizes in others, that 
12. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 72 (Princeton U. Press, 1988) ("What 
explains our contemporary uncertainty (some would say 'crisis') in regard to the Constitu-
tion is the assertion of fundamentally different values within the political realm."); Mark 
Thshnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 62 (Harv. U. 
Press, 1988) (political disagreements create different reading of language). 
13. See generally Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 
83 Mich. L. Rev. 1502 (1985). 
14. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 744 
(1993) ("At most, analogical thinking can give rise to a judgment about probabilities, and 
o~en these are of uncertain magnitude."). I understand that there may be an important 
d1fference between metaphor and analogy for some purposes, see id. at 748 n.26, but I do 
not believe the difference is relevant to this discussion. 
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any other factors would not be true to the genre of the constitu-
tional project. The fundamental characteristics of the constitu-
tional order which give rise to these fine distinctions in legitimacy 
are not made clear.ts 
Without this limitation on sources, what remains is a call to 
read the Constitution to include meanings that arise from its own 
terms, from its structure, express or implied, and from outside its 
four comers but implicit in the nature of the political order that it 
establishes. This idea has been voiced in many forms before, in 
opinions of Supreme Court justices as well as in academic litera-
ture. Justice Douglas, for example, called for constitutional rec-
ognition of the values that "emanate from the totality of the 
constitutional scheme under which we live" in his famous dissent 
in Poe v. Ullman.t6 Justice Cardozo spoke of "immunities . . . 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"t7 while Justice Harlan 
urged "continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of his-
tory, solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our soci-
ety, and wise application of the great roles that the doctrines of 
federalism and separation of powers have played [in] preserving 
American freedoms. "ts Owen Fiss has called upon the judiciary 
"to give meaning to our constitutional values";t9 Christopher 
Eisgruber would have the courts look for a "shared American 
belief" that the constitutional text may reftect;2o and Paul Brest 
has stated that "the practice of constitutional adjudication should 
enforce those, and only those, values which are fundamental to 
our society."2t In general, I think that Harris is insufficiently 
appreciative of the degree to which contemporary literature on 
constitutional interpretation has already come far in the direction 
that he advocates.22 
15. In his introduction, Harris expressly declares war on the values represented by 
clarity of expression, as antagonistic to his enterprise. 
16. 367 u.s. 497 (1961). 
17. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1927). 
18. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, SOl (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
judgment). 
19. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1979). 
20. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Re-
lation Between Principle and Prruhnce, 43 Duke LJ. 1, 40 (1993). 
21. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
Rev. 204,227 (1980); see also Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 24 (Bobbs· 
Merrill. 1962) ("government should serve ... certain enduring values"). For a contrary 
view, see Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 396 
(1981) ("It is, therefore, fundamentally wrong to believe that one can ascertain the mean-
ing of the constitution by asking: 'Is this what America stands for?' "). 
22. This is true even regarding Harris' position on which interpretative approach 
should be followed in a given case. He advocates the use of as many different modes of 
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But I question the wisdom of the project. At bottom, what 
Harris has attempted to do, I believe, is to create a middle 
ground between those who would say that the text of the Consti-
tution must be the sole source of guidance in applying the docu-
ment's terms (with or without an accompanying focus on original 
intent) and those who open up the inquiry so broadly that they 
cannot lay claim to any real grounding in the document itself. 
Both extremes are troubling at a theoretical level. The textual-
ists are troubling because they artificially constrain the develop-
ment of the polity, deifying the morally dubious status quo of two 
centuries ago and depriving subsequent generations of choices 
and judgments, except as they may be reflected in constitutional 
amendments.23 The utterly unfettered interpretative approaches, 
on the other hand, have been accused of losing sight of all 
grounding and consequently bestowing too much discretion on 
those who render the so-called interpretations.24 Harris has 
made a valiant effort to harness the determinacy of the one to the 
dynamism of the other. 
Yet the problem with Harris' solution to this venerable di-
lemma lies in the very idea that appropriate constitutional theory 
could possibly, or should conceivably, be cabined in a two-axis 
model. The project brings to mind Robert Nozick's "tower" im-
age of the grand theory: 
Philosophers often seek to deduce their total view from a 
few basic principles, showing how all follows from their intui-
tively based axioms. The rest of the philosophy then strikes 
readers as depending upon these principles. One brick is piled 
upon another to produce a tall philosophical tower, one brick 
wide. When the bottom brick crumbles or is removed, all top-
ples, burying even those insights that were independent of the 
starting point.25 
interpretation as possible. This was Richard Fallon's point, more or less, in Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1189 (1987), and shares some important common ground with the legal 
pragmatists in the catholic sweep of its recommended interpretative sources. See Daniel 
A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1331 {1988). See also Rebecca L. Brown, 
Tradition and Insight, 103 Yale LJ. In, 214-216 (1993) (suggesting reliance on a broad 
variety of authorities in the interpretative process). 
23. See, e.g., Mark V. Thshnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Inter-
pretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 127, 804-05 (1083); Brest, 60 B.U. L. 
Rev. at 27-08 (cited in note 20). 
24. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 157-58 (Belknap Press, 1986); Bork, 
The Tempting of America 145 (cited in note 9); Monaghan, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 356-68 
(cited in note 21). 
25. Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 3 (Harv. U. Press, 1981). See Far-
ber, 72 Minn. L. Rev. at 1336-37 (cited in note 22) (discussing weaknesses of foundation-
alist philosophical analysis). 
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While eschewing the rigidity of foundationalist legal theories, 
Harris has erected his own tower, one brick wide. 
The danger of such a tower, in my view, is that it tends to 
appear to supply answers to difficult questions, without actually 
doing so. Thus, the judge is invited to mask her judgments be-
hind a veil called legitimacy-falling into the proper quadrant-
when in fact she has made a choice about what influences she 
will consider to be dispositive in her decisionmaking process. 
This escape route for the judge to avoid judging contributes noth-
ing to the legibility of the constitutional order. Indeed it fosters 
disingenuous decisionmaking and diminishes the public's under-
standing of what its judges are doing, just as surely as those who 
modestly promise to "faithfully interpret the Constitution" and 
"avoid the tendency to legislate from the Bench."26 
Harris' is admittedly a strange type of foundationalism, yet 
foundationalist it remains in its quest for a unified principle that 
would provide the only legitimate basis for constitutional deci-
sionmaking. The funny thing about this particular brand of 
foundationalism is that it contains within it some heterogeneity, 
some breadth and some room for flexibility within the confines 
of the matrix. The effort to provide some latitude to otherwise 
cramped theories of interpretation is a noble one. But if its flexi-
bility and non-foundationalist attributes are to be seen as its re-
deeming features, then one must ask why the matrix? It seems to 
me that the model, in purporting to limit the scope of legitimate 
inquiry in interpreting the Constitution, is artificial and 
superfluous. 
Perhaps Harris did not intend to make a contribution to the 
field of interpretative theory at all, but rather wrote this book to 
respond to his own felt need to justify the amazing fact that 
"human beings can create and regulate a political world with 
words." I share his awe, and indeed intrigue at the same obser-
vation was instrumental in my own decision to pursue law, rather 
than philosophy or linguistics, as a profession. Thus, while I 
would not minimize the miraculous nature of the phenomenon 
that captivates Harris, I think that to a member of the legal com-
munity the marvel of words binding action is akin to watching a 
toddler learn to speak: we feel the wonder that such a thing can 
happen, but we have no doubt that it does happen. Indeed, the 
ability of words to control behavior and bind human action is a 
26. President's Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Clarence Thomas to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and a News Conference in 
Kennebunkport, Maine, 27 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 868 (July 1, 1991). 
1994-95] BOOK REVIEW 599 
premise underlying all law-common, statutory, regulatory; oral 
and written-not just constitutional law. Thus, the great lengths 
to which Harris goes to explore the possibility that a nation can 
be bound with words is reminiscent of angels and the pin. 
At the same time, Harris is not touched by a tension that I 
believe legal theorists do feel some concern for: the belief that, at 
the end of the day, there remains a need for a constitution to 
have some effect as law. That is, a theory must aspire ultimately 
to bear in some way on the resolution of real questions that arise 
in actual cases. Although Harris recognizes that "[t]he constitu-
tional order is not just a construction for the mind, like a work of 
fiction or poetry, or even, somewhat less emphatically, a work of 
political philosophy," he nevertheless does not consider any part 
of his abstract undertaking to include even the aspiration to an 
answer of any constitutional question. He avows that, for him, 
interpretation is "a way of looking at the political world." Sheep-
ishly, I must confess that such an approach to the project of inter-
pretation leaves me ultimately unsatisfied. 
THE MORAL TRADffiON OF AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETA-
TION. H. Jefferson Powell.1 Durham: Duke University 
Press. 1993. Pp. ix, 296. $39.00. 
Jim Chenz 
Just as the Gospel reminds Christians that "the last shall be 
first,"3 the observation that "less is more:• surely does not damn 
H. Jefferson Powell's most recent work with faint praise. In The 
Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism: A Theological 
Interpretation, Powell launches an unapologetically Christian at-
tack on America's long-standing civic faith in constitutional law. 
Powell's core message-that there is no such thing as a Christian 
approach to constitutionalism-heralds a radical and powerful 
new model for understanding the relationship between personal 
Christianity and public law. 
1. Professor of Law and Divinity, Duke University. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I thank Mark Mousesian 
for his helpful comments. 
3. Matthew 19:30, 20:16; Mark 10:31; Luke 13:30 (King James). 
